In Experiment 1 subjects were asked to judge whether an arrow was pointing up or pointing down at various heights inside a surrounding rectangle. They were faster on an arrow pointing up the higher it was in the rectangle, and they were faster on an arrow pointing down the lower it was in the rectangle. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were designed to test three sources for this "congruity effect." The intrusive height information for each arrow was assumed to facilitate or interfere with (a) the activation of the correct motor response; (b) the maintenance of the implicit instruction "Is it pointing up, or is it pointing down?"; or (c) the selection of the criterial perceptual information as a basis for the response. All three experiments were consistent with c, but not with a or b. Indeed, the results contrasted with previous demonstrations of the Stroop effect in certain critical features.
In Experiment 1 subjects were asked to judge whether an arrow was pointing up or pointing down at various heights inside a surrounding rectangle. They were faster on an arrow pointing up the higher it was in the rectangle, and they were faster on an arrow pointing down the lower it was in the rectangle. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were designed to test three sources for this "congruity effect." The intrusive height information for each arrow was assumed to facilitate or interfere with (a) the activation of the correct motor response; (b) the maintenance of the implicit instruction "Is it pointing up, or is it pointing down?"; or (c) the selection of the criterial perceptual information as a basis for the response. All three experiments were consistent with c, but not with a or b. Indeed, the results contrasted with previous demonstrations of the Stroop effect in certain critical features.
In a recent experiment we found that people were subject to a curious influence when they attempted to judge the direction in which an arrow was pointing. In that experiment-described later as Experiment 1-we confronted subjects with a picture of an arrow at one of several heights within a rectangle. The arrow was pointing either UP or DOWN/ and each subject's task was to decide as quickly as possible which way it was pointing, up or down. What happened was this: When the arrow was pointing UP, the subjects were faster the higher the arrow was in the rectangle; but when the arrow was pointing DOWN, they were faster the lower it was in the rectangle. Simply described, the subjects were faster when the arrow's "intrusive attribute" (its height) had the same value as its "criterial attribute" (its direction). We will call this the congrtiity effect in absolute judgments.
At first glance the congruity effect appears to be identical to a phenomenon described by Shor (1970) . He presented subjects with block arrows pointing either UP or DOWN and containing, for distraction, either the word up or the word down. He, like us, asked his subjects to say which way the arrow was pointing, up or down. He found that subjects were faster when the intrusive attribute (the word up or down inside the arrow) had the same value as the criterial attribute (the actual direction UP or DOWN). In analogous experiments, Morton (1969) and Fox, Shor, and Steinman (1971) found that judgments of the position of a word within a rectangle could be facilitated or interfered with by the meaning of the word itself (up, down, left, or right; North, East, South, or West) . Similarly, Dyer (1972) was able to induce facilitation and interference in judgments of the direction of movement of words on an oscilloscope screen by using the words up, down, left, and right whose meaning was either congruent or incongruent with their direction of movement. As Morton, Shor, and Dyer noted, these phenomena all resemble the well-known Stroop effect, where naming the color of the ink in which a word is printed is facilitated or interfered with by the content of the word itself (see Dyer, 1973; Hintzman, Carre, Eskridge, Owens, Shaff, & Sparks, 1972; Keele, 1972; Stroop, 1935) . Morton, Shor, and Dyer argued that these phenomena can be explained with the same model that explains most, if not all, other Stroop effects.
But the congruity effect we discovered differs from these three investigators' Stroop effects in one important respect. In their displays, and in most other Stroop demonstrations, either the criterial or the intrusive attribute was a word, letter, or digit, something linguistic in nature. In our displays, on the other hand, both attributes were prima facie perceptual in nature. This suggests that the congruity effect may originate from a source entirely different from Morton's, Shor's, and Dyer's Stroop effects, so it has the potential of telling us something new about perceptual codes and their role in perceptual judgments.
In this article we will examine three broad models for the congruity effect and test them in a verification task. In this task the subject first reads a single-word "instruction," up or down. Then, while timed, he looks at a display containing an UP or DOWN arrow and responds "true" if the instruction correctly describes the direction of the arrow and "false" if it does not. We assume that the timed part of this task consists roughly of three stages (see Clark & Chase, 1972) . At the perceptual coding stage, the subject forms a perceptual code for the arrow's direction, say direction (vertical (+polar) ) for an UP arrow. At the comparison stage, he compares this perceptual code against the instructional code, say direction (vertical (-polar) ) for the instruction down. If they match, he computes the code corresponding to the motor response "true," say truth (+polar); if they don't match, he computes the code corresponding to "false," say truth (-polar) . At the final motor stage, he initiates the motor response corresponding to the response code that has been activated. In our task this consisted of a press of a "true" or "false"' button.
In this scheme the intrusive code, here the arrow's height, can affect the truefalse judgment in only three possible ways, and this leads to the following three models.
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The motor competition model. In this model the intrusive attribute affects the activation of the motor response. When an UP or DOWN arrow is high, it is assumed to elicit the additional perceptual code position (vertical (+polar) ). Since this code overlaps with part of the response code truth ( + polar) , it tends to activate the "true" response itself and thereby facilitate the response "true" and interfere with the response "false." But when an UP or DOWN arrow is low, it elicits position (vertical (-polar) ), which tends to activate truth (-polar) , facilitating "false" and interfering with "true." So the model predicts that responses will be speeded up when the position (HIGH or LOW) and the response ("true" or "false") have the same polarity, and they will be slowed down otherwise.
This prediction is indicated in Table 1 . In a verification task like ours, there must be at least eight configurations: The instruction is either up or down, the arrow's direction is either UP or DOWN, and its position is either-HIGH or LOW. Of these eight, four should be speeded up and four slowed down if the motor competition model is correct. The four speeded up are marked with 0 in column 1, and the four slowed down are marked with +r, indicating that the second four should take r longer, on the average, than the first four, regardless of other differences among the configurations. Thus, if the motor competition model is correct, parameter r should be reliably greater than 0. Statistically, this is equivalent to predicting a significant Instruction X Direction X Position interaction, as Table 1 shows.
The instructional competition model. In this model the intrusive position code gets confused with the instructional code. Imagine a display with an UP arrow high in the rectangle when the instruction is down. The subject viewing the display, by this model, mistakenly compares the direction code direction (vertical (+polar) ) first against the intrusive position code position (vertical ( + polar) ), finding a match and readying the response "true." But before he responds, he realizes the mistake, makes the right comparison, and comes up with the correct response "false." In this instance, by readying the wrong answer, he will be slowed down in giving correct response "false." In general, the model predicts that responses will be speeded up when the position (HIGH or LOW) and instruction (up or down) have the same polarity, and they will be slowed down otherwise. As shown in Table 1 , this predicts that parameter s will be reliably greater than 0, which is equivalent to predicting a significant Position X Instruction interaction.
The perceptual competition model. In this model the intrusive position code gets confused instead with the criterial direction code. Imagine again a display with an UP arrow high in the rectangle when the instruction is down. The subject here, according to this model, mistakenly compares the intrusive position code against the instruction code, finding a match and readying the response "true." But before he responds, he catches the error, makes the right comparison, and comes up with the correct response "true." Here, because he had readied "true" by the preliminary comparison, he is speeded up in giving the response "true." In general, the model predicts that responses will be speeded up when the arrow's position (HIGH or LOW) and its direction (UP or DOWN) have the same polarity, and they will be slowed down otherwise. This model, then, predicts that parameter t in Table 1 should be reliably greater than 0, or equivalently that there will be a significant Position X Direction interaction.
In summary, the motor, instructional, and perceptual competition models predict, respectively, that parameters r, s, and t will be reliably greater than 0. These parameters represent the three possible ways the intrusive attribute can interact-both logically and statistically-with the criterial attribute, the instruction, or both. Seymour (1974) , in effect, has already tested the motor and instructional competition models for a Stroop task similar to those of Morton, Shor, and Dyer. He presented subjects with a word placed either above or below a square; inside the square was the instruction above or below. The subjects were to say "true" when the external word was in the place specified by the instruction and "false" when it was not. When Seymour used as external words yes and no, and right and wrong, he expected them to facilitate and interfere with the responses "true" and "false." Yet he found no interference effects. In terms of our models, parameters r, s, and t were 7, 14, and 25 msec for the yes/no experiment and 21, 15, and -2 msec for the right/wrong experiment, none of which were reliably greater than 0. But when he used as external words up and down, parameters r, s, and t were 32, 102, and 14 msec. Param-eter ^ was reliably greater than 0, whereas parameters r and t were not. Seymour's experiment, then, fit the instructional competition model. This suggests that the Stroop effects in Morton's, Shor's, and Dyer's tasks may also have originated in a confusion of the intrusive words (e.g., up and down} with the implicit instruction (e.g., "Is the arrow pointing up, or is it pointing down?"), not from interference with the motor response or from confusion with the criterial perceptual code. The question that remains, then, is whether the congruity effect has the same explanation. Because the intrusive code in the congruity effect is perceptual rather than linguistic in nature, it may not have. The four experiments we designed were directed at this question. Experiment 1 was planned as a demonstration of the basic congruity effect, and Experiments 2, 3, and 4 as tests of the three models in several variations on the verification task.
One final point: We have denoted our perceptual, instructional, and response codes as abstract composites like position (vertical (+ polar)} to emphasize two points. First, these codes cannot be "implicit" responses, like "up," with only phonetic or articulatory properties. If both position and direction were coded alike, for example as "up" and "down," the subject could never tell the two dimensions apart; on the other hand, if position were coded as "high" and "low" and direction as "up" and "down," there would be no reason to predict selective facilitation or interference. Second, the codes must reflect the "interpretive" character of the perceptual attributes. Position intrudes on direction only because its code has interpretive elements in common with the code for direction, namely, the elements of verticality and polarity. We would expect very little intrusion if the arrow were varied from side to side instead. An interpretive code is also required to explain why interference in the classic Stroop effect increases as the intrusive attribute becomes more and more similar semantically to the criterial attribute (see Fox et al., 1971; Klein, 1964; Seymour, 1973a Seymour, , 1973b .
EXPERIMENT 1 Method
On each of 204 trials subjects were shown a pictorial configuration consisting of an arrow pointing either up or DOWN within a rectangle, and they were required to indicate, while timed, which way the arrow was pointing, up or down.
The 12 distinct configurations we used each consisted of an arrow 1 cm long centered horizontally in a rectangle 4 cm wide and 5 cm tall. The arrow pointed either UP or DOWN, and the midpoint of its shaft was 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 3.5, or 4 cm from the top of the rectangle. These six positions-three above the center, three below the center, and none straddling the center-will be called, numbering from top to bottom, Positions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. Each configuration was drawn in india ink and presented in the lower of two 13 X 7 cm viewing fields in a modified Iconix tachistoscope. The two viewing fields were aligned vertically with the upper field 1 cm above the lower one. (The upper field was used in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 for the presentation of the single-word instruction.) Between trials the subjects looked at a blank 13 X 15 cm adaptation field that coincided with the area covered by the two viewing fields. The displays were 51 cm from the eyes.
To begin each trial, the subject pressed a "ready" button. The configuration appeared .5 sec later and remained on until the subject pressed either the "up" or the "down" button to indicate his answer. He was timed in milliseconds from the onset of the configuration to the press of the button. He pressed the "up" button with one thumb, the "down" 'button with the other, and the "ready" button, placed midway between the "up" and "down" buttons, with either thumb. The responses "up" and "down" were assigned to the left and right buttons for half the subjects and to the reverse for the other half.
Each subject went through 12 practice trials and 192 experimental trials. The practice trials consisted of the 12 configurations in a random order. The experimental trials consisted of eight blocks of 24 trials, where each block was made up of two instances of the 12 configurations in an individually randomized order. In this and the remaining experiments, the subjects were all Stanford University undergraduates either fulfilling a course requirement in introductory psychology or earning $2. There were 12 subjects in Experiment 1 after one was eliminated for making more than 10% errors. They were instructed to respond as quickly as possible without making errors.
Results
Figure 1 plots the mean latencies for each of the 12 configurations. Each mean is an average of the 12 subject means once the error trials had been removed. As Figure 1 makes plain, there was a strong congruity effect. Roughly speaking, the higher the arrow, the faster the decision on UP arrows and the slower the decision on DOWN arrows. The trends for the UP and DOWN arrows (13.8 and -6.0 msec/position, respectively) 8 were reliably different from each other, as indicated by the significant Direction X Posi-.tion interaction, F(5, 50) = 11.77, p < .001. Moreover, the difference between the two trends was highly regular. In order, the UP minus DOWN difference scores at Positions 1 through 7 were +71, +62, +25, -2, -21, and -49 msec. This trend had a slope of 19.8 msec/position and linear correlation of .99, F(l, 50)= 57.76, p < .001. The residual from this linear effect was not reliable.
The overall means for Positions 1 through 7 (490, 471, 475, 477, 488 , and 514 msec, respectively), differed reliably from each other, F(5, 50)= 13.44, p < .001, reflecting both a linear trend and a quadratic trend. First, there was a general increase in latencies from Position 1 to Position 7. This linear trend had a slope of 3.9 msec/position and a highly reliable correlation of .58, F(l, 50)= 22.71, p < .001. Second, there was a general increase in latencies from the middle positions to the outer ones. The quadratic component among the six means was highly reliable, with a correlation of .77, /?(!, 50)= 40.03, p < .001. Once the linear and quadratic trends were subtracted from these means, the residual variance was not reliable, F(3, 50)= 1.49.
In summary, the 12 means in Figure 1 are neatly described by a statistical model (a descriptive, not explanatory model) that has only three additive components: (a) Latencies increase linearly with position, (b) latencies increase from the middle to the outer positions as aquadratic, and (c) UP minus DOWN decreases linearly with position. This model, using 3 of the 11 degrees of freedom in the latencies, accounts for 90.0% of the variance among the 12 means. Components a, b, and c account for 9.7%, 17.1%, and 63.2% of the variance, so the congruity effect, Component c, clearly accounts for the lion's share of the variance. Another 6.9% 3 All slopes reported in Experiments 1 and 2 were computed from least squares linear fits of the data. of the variance is accounted for (with 1 degree of freedom) by the 14-msec advantage of UP over DOWN arrows. This difference, however, was not reliable, F < 1, nor was the rest of the residual variance from this statistical model.
The overall error rate was 2.4%, ranging from .5% to 7.8% for individual subjects. Though few in number and hence not very reliable, the errors generally increased from Position 1 to 7 for UP (1.0%, 0%, 0%, 0%, 4.7%, 4.7%) and decreased for DOWN (5.7%, 5.7%, 3.1%, .5%, 2.1%, 1.0%). The errors therefore correlated highly with the latencies (r=.77), ruling out any major speed-accuracy trade-off that might confound the results.
Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrates the basic congruity effect. The UP arrow was judged faster the higher it was, and the DOWN arrow was judged faster the lower it was. Indeed, the two trends crossed in a smooth linear trend without any discontinuities. This may be explained as follows. The farther an arrow is from the middle of the rectangle, the more discriminably high or low it is.
And the more discriminably high or low it is, the earlier the intrusive position code is formed and the more likely it is to intrude on the judgment process (regardless of the model). So the linearity of the congruity effect forcefully demonstrates that the intrusive code becomes more effective in its facilitation or interference the earlier it is formed.
The Congruity effect here reflects both facilitation and interference (see also Clark & Brownell, Note 1). Position 4, our unused middle position, can be considered neither high nor low. When the UP arrow was above that position, there was facilitation ; when it was below that position, there was interference. The DOWN arrow showed the opposite effects. These facilitation and interference effects were superimposed, additively, on two other trends. Judgment time increased slightly both the lower the arrow was in the rectangle and the farther it was from the center of the rectangle. These two trends most likely originated in the way subjects scanned the displays. The subjects probably scanned from top to bottom on some occasions and from the middle outwards on others. The important point is that these scanning effects are additive to the congruity effect and cannot be used to explain it away.
EXPERIMENT 2 Experiment 2 was designed to distinguish among the three models described in the introduction to this article.
Method
Subjects were shown on each trial a one-word instruction, for example, up, and then an arrow within a rectangle. While timed, they were to indicate "true" or "false," depending on whether or not the word correctly described the arrow. There were two distinct tasks. In the direction task, the subjects judged the direction of the arrow, whether it pointed up or down. The 24 displays for this task consisted of the instruction up or down combined with each of the 12 configurations used in Experiment 1. In the position task, the subjects judged the position of the arrow, whether it was high or low. The 24 displays used here were the same as before but with the instructions high and low in place of up and down. The instructions were typed in elite and appeared in the center of the upper 13 X 7 cm viewing field of the tachistoscope. Otherwise, the equipment and displays were identical to those in Experiment 1.
There were 20 subjects, half of whom received the direction task first and half of whom received the position task first. The former subjects received 16 practice direction trials, 96 experimental direction trials (four blocks of the 24 displays). 8 practice position trials, and 96 experimental position trials. The design was analogous for the latter half of the subjects. The instruction appeared in the upper viewing field .5 sec after the start of each trial and remained on for 1 sec. When it disappeared, the configuration appeared in the lower field and remained on until the subject pressed the "true" or "false" button. The timing, randomization, and counterbalancing were otherwise the same as in Experiment 1. Figure 2 plots the mean latencies, computed as in Experiment l,.for the 24 displays in the direction task. It reveals a striking congruity effect of the same form as in Experiment 1. Generally, the up arrow was judged faster the higher it was, and the DOWN arrow was judged faster the lower it was, regardless of other factors in the experiment. This congruity effect was highly reliable, as shown by the significant Position (1 to 7) X Direction (UP vs. DOWN) interactions, F(5, 90) =7.57, p < .001. Moreover, the position of the arrow did not interact reliably with anything else-either with the instruction (up vs. down), F < 1, or with the response ("true" vs. "false"), F<\. Statistically, therefore, the two UP curves in Figure 2 were parallel, as were the two DOWN curves. This is the pattern predicted by the perceptual competition model, not by the motor competition model or by the instructional competition model.
Results

Direction task.
In more detail, the two UP curves, averaged together, increased 18.6 msec/position with a linear correlation of .88, F(\, 90) = 34.82, p < .001. The DOWN curves decreased 6.0 msec/position with a correlation of -.54,
(1, 90)= 3.54, p < .10. In order, the UP minus DOWN difference scores at Positions 1 to 7 were +128, +82, +29, +10, +32, and -62 msec. These decreased 24.6 msec/ position with a highly significant linear correlation of .90, F(l, 90)= 30.66, p < .001. The residual from this linear trend was not significant, F(4, 90)= 1.80. This pattern for the congruity effect looks remarkably like that in Experiment 1.
There were four other reliable differences in the direction judgments. UP arrows were 36 msec faster than DOWN arrows, F(l, 18)= 8.92, p < .01. Up instructions were 94 msec faster than down instructions, F(l, 18)= 32.86, p < .001. "True" instructions (those for up-up and DOWNdown) were judged 100 msec faster than "false" instructions (those for up-do-wn and DOWN-M/>),F(1, 18) = 53.01, p < .001. And there were reliable differences across the six vertical positions of the arrow, F'(5, 90) = 3.79, p < .005. Latencies increased an average of 6.3 msec/position with a correlation of .64. This trend was reliable, F(l, 90)= 7.76, p < .01, but so also was the residual from the linear effect, F(4, 90) = 2.80, p < .05. In this experiment the quadratic trend was not reliable, F < 1, perhaps because the subjects here, unlike those in Experiment 1, had to scan from the instruction in the upper viewing field to the configuration in the lower field and could not accurately find the center of the rectangle before it appeared. In summary, the 24 means in Figure 2 are adequately described by a statistical model similar to the one fitted in Experiment 1. This one has five additive effects : (a) Latencies vary over the six positions, (b) UP arrows are faster than DOWN arrows, (c) UP minus DOWN decreases linearly with position, (d) "true" is faster than "false,"
and (e) up instructions are faster than down instructions. Of the 23 degrees of freedom in the 24 means, Component a requires 5 and the other four components require 1 each for a total of 9 degrees of freedom. This model accounts for 95.0% of the variance. Components a, b, c, d, and e account for 6.8%, 5.1%, 10.8%, 38.1%, and 34.2% of the variance, respectively.
The overall error rate was 2.7%, ranging from 0% to 7.3% for individual subjects. As before, the errors were generally correlated with latencies by condition (r -.53).
Position task. The mean latencies for the position judgments, listed in Table 2 , reveal a 'weak congruity effect at best. According to the perceptual competition model, judgments should have been faster in Positions 1 to 3 than in Positions 5 to 7 given an UP arrow, but just the reverse given a DOWN arrow. Overall, however, the congruity effect was only 31 msec in the predicted direction, and this was not quite significant, F(l, 18) = 3.05, p < .10.
All the other trends one would expect in the position judgments did occur. High was 90 msec faster than low, F(l, 18) =24.05, p < .001. "True" was 50 msec faster than "false," F(l, 18) =13.35, p< .005. The mean latencies increased an average of 144 msec from the highly discriminable outer positions (1 and 7) to the less discriminable inner ones (3 and 5), F(2, 36)= 50.66, p < .001. So the farther an arrow was from the center, the easier it was to judge as high or low. Finally, there were two minor interactions. First, the latencies increased less from the outer to inner positions for the instruction high than for the instruction low, 121 to 167 msec, F(2, 36)= 3.69, p < .05. Second, the increases for the high instruction on the UP arrow and for the low instruction on the DOWN arrow were not monotonic with position as in the other instances. In these cases, Positions 2 and 6 were fastest, not Positions 1 and 7, F(2, 36)= 5.87, p < .01. We have no ready explanations for these two interactions.
The overall error rate was 3.8%, ranging from 0% to 9.4% for individual subjects. The error rates for each condition, listed in Table 2 , correlated .58 with the mean latencies. For this task, the subjects receiving the position task first were reliably slower than those receiving the direction task first, F(l, 18)= 7.04, p < .025. And the former subjects were faster in Positions 1 to 3 than on Positions 5 to 7, whereas the latter yielded the reverse trend, F(l, 18) = 4.72, p < .05. This last result has no ready explanation, though it is rather small.
Discussion
Experiment 2 provided strong evidence that the congruity effect fits the perceptual competition model, and not the motor competition or instructional competition models. The evidence is straightforward. The motor, instructional, and perceptual competition models predict, respectively, that parameters r, s, and t will be reliably greater than 0 (see Table 1 ). Estimates of these parameters in the direction judgments were -14, -1, and 43 msec, respectively. Only t was reliably larger than 0. There is one further consideration. In Experiment 1, the congruity effect became stronger the farther the arrow was from the center of the rectangle, and the same occurred in Experiment 2. So whichever model is correct, its parameter should increase in monotonic steps from the innermost positions (3 and 5) through the middle positions (2 and 6) to the outermost positions (1 and 7). Parameter t increased from 10 to 25 to 94 msec in a highly reliable trend, whereas parameter r did not increase monotonically (-7, -33, 1) nor did parameter s ( -12, 11, -2). The conclusion seems clear. The intrusive position code affected the direction judgments by increasing t, but not by increasing r or s.
In testing the three models for the congruity effect, we have presupposed that the phenomenon we have called the congruity effect in Experiment 2 is the same as the congruity effect in Experiment 1. The parallels between Experiments 1 and 2 appear to justify this .presupposition. The congruity effect was linear over the six positions in both experiments, with correlations of .99 and .90, respectively. The size of the effect was virtually the same in both experiments too. The advantage of UP over DOWN arrows decreased by 20 msec/posi-tion in Experiment 1 and by 25 msec/position in Experiment 2. The difference between the two trends was not significant, F < 1. These parallels strongly suggest that the congruity effect arises from the same source in the verification task as it does in the forced-choice task.
According to all three models we have considered, the position code can facilitate or interfere with the direction code only when it is formed prior to the comparison or response stage. To account for Experiment 1 we had to assume that the position code would be formed earlier the more discriminably high or low the arrow was in the rectangle. Experiment 2 confirmed this assumption directly. In the position task, subjects were faster in deciding whether an arrow was high or low the farther it was from the center of the rectangle.
Taken by itself, however, the position task was disappointing, for it did not turn up a reliable congruity effect of its own. Parameters r, s, and t were estimated at -9, 11, and 31 msec, respectively, and although there is a hint here that the perceptual competition model is most appropriate, the 31 msec estimate for t was not quite reliable. There are two reasons t may have been so slight. First, the six positions we chose may have been much more discriminable than the two directions UP and DOWN, and so although the position codes were formed fast enough to intrude on the direction judgments, the direction codes were not formed fast enough to intrude on the position judgments. Second, for an arrow there were six possible positions, but only two possible directions (UP and DOWN). This may have made position more salient than direction, also leading to position codes being more intrusive on direction judgments than vice versa. We designed Experiments 3 and 4 with these two points in mind.
EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4
Experiments 3 and 4 consisted of a forcedchoice task and a verification task, respectively, but with the arrows varying over only two positions, Positions 3 and 5 from Experiment 1. These two positions were chosen from a pilot experiment because position judgments took at least as long to make for them alone as did direction judgments. The idea was, then, that the direction codes would be formed early enough to intrude on the position judgments and yield a congruity effect. Experiment 3 was designed to measure the relative speeds of "pure" position and direction judgments. Experiment 4 was designed to uncover the congruity effects, if present, in both position and direction judgments. Experiments 3 and 4 were carried out on the same subjects, with Experiment 3 first and Experiment 4 second.
Method
Experiment 3. On each trial subjects were shown an arrow within a rectangle and were required to indicate, while timed, which of two arrows had been presented. On any block of trials the arrow varied on only one attribute, position or direction. So subjects went through the following four blocks of trials in a counterbalanced order: (a) direction judgments with all arrows at Position 3, (b) direction judgments with all arrows at Position 5, (c) position judgments with all arrows pointing UP, and (d) position judgments with all arrows pointing DOWN. The four blocks each consisted of 8 practice trials (four of each configuration) and 16 experimental trials (eight of each configuration), giving a total of 96 trials. For the direction judgments subjects pressed an "up" and "down" button for UP and DOWN arrows, respectively, and for position judgments they pressed "high" and "low" buttons for arrows at Positions 3 and 5, respectively. All subjects used their right hand for the "high" and "up" responses and their left for the "low" and "down" responses. Experiment 3 was like Experiment 1 in all other pertinent respects.
Experiment 4. Experiment 4 was essentially the same as Experiment 2 except that there were only four configurations (an UP or DOWN arrow at Position 3 or 5). As a consequence, there were eight direction displays (the instructions wp and down combined with the four configurations) and eight position displays (high and low combined with the four configurations). The direction task consisted of 8 practice trials (the eight displays) and two blocks of 16 experiments trials (two each of the eight displays) for a total of 40 trials. The position task was analogous. When a subject erred on a display, it was repeated later in that block unless it was missed before. In all other relevant respects, the procedure, apparatus, randomization, counterbalancing, and instructions were the same as in Experiment 2. There were 16 subjects in Experiments 3 and 4 after one was eliminated for making more than 10% errors in Experiment 4.
Results for Experiment 3
As the mean latencies in Table 3 show, the direction judgments were 32 msec faster than the position judgments, F(\, 15) = 15.14, p < .005. The position judgments yielded a reliable 25-msec congruity effect, .F(l, 15)= 6.75, p < .025, although the direction judgments yielded only a small, unreliable 5-msec congruity effect, F < 1. The congruity effect was reliably larger for the former than for the latter, F(\, 15)= 11.67, p < .005. Finally, subjects were 29 msec faster on Position 3 than Position 5 in their position judgments, F(\, 15) =7.50, p< .025. The overall error rate was A%.
We therefore succeeded in finding four configurations with this property: The codes for the directions UP and DOWN were formed at least as quickly as the codes for the two positions. The difference was 32 msec. But there was an unexpected twist. We varied only one dimension-either position or direction-at a time within any one block of trials in an attempt to look at judgments uncontaminated by an intruding dimension. Nevertheless, the direction of the arrows affected the speed of the position judgments, with Position 3 judged faster for UP arrows and Position 5 judged faster for DOWN arrows. So even these "pure" discrimination trials do not provide an uncontaminated measure of speed of position and direction judgments.
Results for Experiment 4
Direction task. The direction judgments in Experiment 4 yielded a congruity effect of 58 msec. As the latencies in Table 4 show, subjects judged UP arrows 81 msec faster in Position 3 than in Position 5, but judged DOWN arrows 34 msec faster in Position 5 than in Position 3. This 58 msec interaction was reliable, F(l, 15)= 5.64, p < .05. Furthermore, the position of the arrow did not interact reliably with either the instruction, F < 1, or the response, F < 1. Thus, as before, the latencies fit the perceptual competition model and did not fit the motor competition or instructional competition models.
There were other parallels with Experiment 2. UP arrows were judged faster than DOWN arrows, by 43 msec, F(l, 15)= 2.34, ns. The instruction up was responded to faster than down, by 138 msec, F(l, 15) = 60.29, p < .001. "True" judgments were made faster than "false" ones, by 87 msec, F(l, 15)= 12.79, p < .005. As in Experiment 2, the UP curves increased with position (81 msec) more than the DOWN curves decreased with position (34 msec), making Position 3 faster overall than Position 5 by 24 msec, which was not reliable. The statistical model considered in Experiment 2 (here using 5 of the 7 degrees of freedom) accounts for 99.2% of the variance among the eight means in Table 4 .
Position task. The position judgments in Experiment 4 yielded a congruity effect of 69 msec. The mean latencies are listed in Table 5 . As they reveal, subjects judged UP arrows 53 msec faster than DOWN arrows when in Position 3 but they judged DOWN arrows 86 msec faster than UP arrows when in Position 5. This 69-msec interaction was highly significant, F(l, 15) =15.95, p< .005, As before, the direction of the arrow did not interact reliably with either the instruction, F(l, 15)-3.35, or the response, .F < 1. So here again, the congruity effect fit only the perceptual competition model.
In addition, high instructions were responded to 151 msec faster than low instructions, F(l, 15) = 29.21, p < .001. "True" was an average of 65 msec faster than "false," F(l, 15) =3.35, ns. A statistical model analogous to the one applied to the direction judgments (using 5 of the 7 degrees of freedom) accounts for 97.1% of the variance among the mean latencies in Table 5 . The deviations from the model are not significant.
The direction judgments were 27 msec faster on the average than the position judgments, F(l, 15) =2.05, ns. Though unreliable, this difference is almost identical to the 32 msec difference in Experiment 3. There were no other reliable differences between the direction and position judgments. Overall, the error rates on the direction and position tasks (shown in Tables 4 and-5) were respectively, 3.3% and 5.5%, correlating .68 and .70 with mean latencies.
Discussion
In Experiment 4 there were congruity effects in both the direction and position judgments, and they had a special form. The motor, instructional, and perceptual competition models predict, respectively, that r, s, and t will be reliably greater than 0. For the direction judgments, estimates of r, s, and t were 16, -3, and 58 msec, and only t was reliably greater than 0. Likewise, for the position judgments, estimates of r, s, and t were -4, 31, and 69 msec, and again only t was reliably greater than 0. So like Experiment 2, Experiment 4 yielded strong evidence for the perceptual competition model as an account for the congruity effect.
We argued earlier that if the direction codes were formed early enough, they would intrude on the position judgments. Experiments 3 and 4 bear out this argument. In the pure discrimination trials of Experiment 3, direction judgments were 32 msec faster than position judgments. From this, one could conclude that the direction codes for UP and DOWN are formed earlier than the position codes for Positions 3 and 5, and that direction should therefore intrude on position judgments more than position should intrude on direction judgments. Indeed, the average congruity effect was slightly larger for the position judgments (69 msec) than for the direction judgments (58 msec), though not reliably so. The logic here, however, relies on the assumption that Experiment 3 provided a pure measure of discriminability for the two positions and the two directions. This assumption may not be entirely correct. As we saw, the directions UP and DOWN intruded on the position judgments even in Experiment 3, perhaps contaminating them as a pure measure of discriminability. If so, Positions 3 and 5 may be more discriminable than Experiment 3 showed, and then the near equality of the two congruity effects in Experiment 4 would follow.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found in Experiment 1 that people, while deciding whether an arrow was pointing up or down, were influenced by another of the arrow's characteristics. The higher the arrow was, the faster people could decide that it pointed up, and the lower it was, the faster they could decide that it pointed down. To get at the locus of this congruity effect, we posed three models-the motor, instructional, and perceptual competition models-and tested for their respective parameters r, s, and t in four verification tasks. The findings were most consistent with the perceptual competition model. Parameter t was reliable in three of the four tasks, whereas parameters r and s were not reliable in any. And in parallel with the congruity effect in Experiment 1, parameter t in Experiment 2 got larger the farther the arrow was from the center of the rectangle, whereas parameters r and s did not. The evidence for the perceptual competition model seems quite solid.
Our findings are in striking contrast with those of Seymour (1974) on a very similar task. Compare the position task in our Experiment 4 with his Experiment 3. In both tasks the subjects were required to decide whether or not a figure was high, or low, in a rectangle. But the two tasks differed in the figure whose height was being judged. In our task it was an arrow, and its direction was intrusive; in his task it was a word (up or down), and its meaning was intrusive. In our task the latencies fit the perceptual competition model with a reliable t. In his they fit the instructional competition model with a reliable s. So the nature of the intrusive attribute may be critical.
One is tempted to reason as follows. When the intrusive attribute is perceptual in nature, it intrudes on the perceptual code; when it is linguistic in nature, it intrudes on the instructional code. And this holds for the whole range of Stroop effects. So, for example, the present congruity effect has a different origin from Shor's Stroop effect (1970) , despite their similar appearance. But without further empirical support, this is just a conjecture, though surely an interesting one. Instead, one could follow an alternative line of reasoning. The three models we tested are not mutually exclusive: More than one could be true at a time. Indeed, in the position task of Experiment 4, there was a hint in the data that parameter s, in addition to t, might be reliably greater than 0. It is possible, then, that the intrusive attribute affects the perceptual code, the instructional code, or both, depending on other factors in the experiment. In Seymour's task, for example, the instruction and intrusive word were presented simultaneously (in ours, they were presented successively), and that may explain why they were so easily confused.
In any case our findings raise the possibility that there are multiple loci of facilitation and interference in the traditional Stroop effects discussed in the literature (see Dyer, 1973) . If so, models of the Stroop effect must allow for this possibility, and none we are aware of do. It seems natural, for example, to view our congruity effect and Seymour's (1974) Stroop effect simply as two varieties of the same phenomenon. But then not one of the Stroop models we know of (e.g., Dalrymple-Alford & Azkoul, 1972; Dyer, 1973; Morton & Chambers, 1973; Seymour, 1974 ) is able to handle both simultaneously. Seymour's model, for example, appears to predict that our task would yield the same congruity effect, if any, as his. Yet it did not. Our successive stage model, on the other hand, accommodates these contrasting results by allowing the intrusive code to enter at several points in the process.
We have been rather vague so far about the exact workings of the perceptual competition model; now we will consider two specific ways of characterizing it. In the first, the perceptual delay model, the intrusive attribute speeds up or slows down the original formation of the criterial perceptual code, and all this happens at the perceptual stage. The code direction (vertical (+ polar) ) is formed quickly when the UP arrow is high, but slowly when the UP arrow is low. In the second model, the perceptual confusion model, the action is all at the comparison stage. This stage has to compare the criterial perceptual code with the instruction code while ignoring the intrusive perceptual code. Sometimes, however, the intrusive code is inadvertently compared first, and this facilitates the later correct comparison when the intrusive code is congruent with the criterial code, but interferes with it when it is not.
The available evidence gives a slight edge to the perceptual delay model. In this model the intrusive attribute affects the perceptual stage and therefore cannot interact with the instruction or response. In the other model, the intrusive attribute affects the comparison stage, and so it can interact with the instruction or response since the comparison stage makes use of the instruction code and computes the response code. But as we saw, the congruity effect did not interact reliably with the instruction or response in any of the four verification tasks. Nor did the congruity effect change size or shape from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, where there was a radical change in the comparison stage from a forced-choice process to a verification process. All this evidence, admittedly negative evidence, adds some plausibility to the perceptual delay model. The perceptual delay model, if correct, may have quite a concrete interpretation. Consider the congruity effect in the direction judgments. At its base, direction is simply change of position, and so coding direction consists of coding change of position. For example, the UP arrow is coded as having a potential position that is high relative to its present position. It is easy to see, then, how facilitation or interference could occur. When the UP arrow is high, its actual position is coded as high relative to the middle, and this is somehow confused with the coding of its potential position as high relative to its actual position. Facilitation would result. When the UP arrow is low, its actual position is coded as low relative to the middle, and in an analogous way this would lead to interference. The point is that both the direction and position codes embody implicit comparisons of physical position, and in these comparisons themselves the facilitation and interference may occur.
In Experiments 1 through 4 we also happened to find in the latencies a consistent advantage of UP over DOWN, up over down, high over low, and "true" over "false." These differences are summarized in Table   TABLE 6 6. The "true"-"false" difference is consistent with the Clark and Chase (1972) model for verification, which posits an extra mental operation for detecting a mismatch and computing "false" over detecting a match and computing "true." The advantage of high over low is consistent with a considerable literature (see Clark, 1969) that shows that unmarked adjectives (like high) are easier to encode and compare than marked adjectives (like low). Similarly, the advantage of up over down fits previous findings (Clark, 1973 (Clark, , 1974 Clark, Carpenter, & Just, 1973; Clark & Chase, 1972) that positive preposition (e.g., above, on top of, in front of, ahead of, and before) are normally easier to encode and compare than implicitly negative ones (e.g., below, underneath, in back oj t behind, and after). As for UP and DOWN, UP was faster than DOWN in those tasks where direction was a criterial attribute (the direction tasks), but not in those tasks where it was not (the position tasks). Speculatively, then, UP is faster than DOWN, just as up is faster than down and high faster than low, when it takes part in the comparison process, but not when it does not. What we have found here fits neatly with the congruity effects in comparative judgments as illustrated in a recent experiment by Clark, Banks, and Lucy (Note 2; see Banks, Clark, & Lucy, 1975 , for a review). When subjects were shown two UP arrows, they were faster at deciding which was higher; but when shown two DOWN arrows, they were faster at deciding which was lower.
As Banks et al. explained it, the two UP arrows tended to be coded in terms of highness, and the two DOWN arrows in terms of lowntss. Consequently, the codes for the UP arrows matched the instruction
